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6.1 Introduction
The evaluation of an exchange market is a multi-faceted problem. An
important criterion is the ability to achieve allocative eﬃciency. Gode
and Sunder (1993) shows that a continuous double auction for single-
unit trades leads to an eﬃcient allocation even when the traders ex-
hibit “zero-intelligence”; in other words, market protocols are active
contributors in the search for a better outcome. Under reasonable cir-
cumstances, most of the commonly used market protocols share the
ability to help traders discover an eﬃcient allocation.
As suggested in Hurwicz (1994), however, the attainment of alloca-
tive eﬃciency is only a necessary condition for the eﬀectiveness of a
trading protocol and one should take into account other dimensions.
Assuming zero intelligence, LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2007) compares the
performance of diﬀerent market protocols with regard both to alloca-
tive eﬃciency and other criteria such as excess volume or price dis-
persion. Their study considers agents with decreasing marginal utility
that can repeatedly make single-unit trades and examines four common
protocols: batch auction, continuous double auction, nondiscretionary
dealership, and a hybrid of these latter two. All protocols exhibit a
remarkable capacity to achieve allocative eﬃciency. However, stark dif-
ferences in performance emerge over the other dimensions. These diﬀer-
ences persist even when the assumption of zero intelligence is removed;
LiCalzi and Pellizzari (see 2006).
The general conclusion is that although common market protocols
may be close substitutes in helping (even zero-intelligent) traders to
attain eﬃciency, they behave quite diﬀerently in many respects. This
paper expands this line of research moving from the evaluation of al-
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locative eﬀectiveness to the assessment of allocative fairness. See Fehr
et al. (1993) for a diﬀerent line of attack on this theme.
Any trading protocol that attains allocative eﬃciency has two ef-
fects. From a static point of view, it moves the traders from their initial
endowment to a ﬁnal (eﬃcient) position where no further paretian im-
provements are possible and all gains from trade are realized. This abil-
ity to help traders discover and exploit all gains from trade pertains to
the allocative eﬀectiveness of a market protocol. From a dynamic point
of view, on the other hand, the denouement of a trading session decides
how these gains are distributed among the traders. The performance
of a trading protocol in this respect pertains to its allocative fairness.
A protocol that is allocatively eﬃcient never leaves unrealized gains
from trade. A protocol that is allocatively fair makes sure that these
gains are equitably distributed among the traders. While many deﬁ-
nitions of equitability are possible, there is a general sense that each
traders should be entitled to a share of the gains from trade that his
being in the market creates. In this paper, we consider the same four
common protocols that we have shown to be allocatively eﬃcient (even
under zero intelligence) and we ask the following question. Suppose
that the market is populated with only two families of agents. Both
families are using trading strategies that are individually rational, but
the second family enjoys a potential trading advantage on the ﬁrst one.
Which of these market protocols is more eﬀective in making sure that
the ﬁrst family of agents overall loses the least on his “fair share” of
gains from trade?
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 6.2 describes
the model tested in our computational experiments and formalizes our
research question. Section 6.3 details the experimental design and pro-
vides detailed instructions for its replication. Section 6.4 reports on the
results obtained and Section 6.5 oﬀers our conclusions.
6.2 The model
We use the same setup as in LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2007), where a sim-
ple exchange economy admits a unique eﬃcient allocation for the single
good to be traded. Given that the market protocols attain allocative
eﬃciency, this implies convergence to the same ﬁnal allocation of the
good and facilitates comparisons.
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6.2.1 The environment
We consider an economy with n traders. There is cash and one good,
which we call “stock”. Each trader i has an initial endowment of cash
ci ≥ 0 and shares si ≥ 0. Each trader i has CARA preferences over
his ﬁnal wealth, with a coeﬃcient of risk tolerance ki > 0. Therefore,
trader i’s excess demand function for stock (net of his endowment si)
is the linear function
qi(p) = τki(µ− p)− si. (6.1)
where µ is the mean and τ = 1/σ2 is the reciprocal of the variance
(a.k.a. as the “precision”) of the distribution of the ﬁnal value of the
stock. Each trader knows µ and τ as well as his endowment and his
demand function, but otherwise has no information on the other agents.
Let K =
∑
i ki be the sum of traders’ coeﬃcients of risk toler-
ance, while S =
∑
i si and C =
∑
i ci are the total stock and cash
endowments. The unique eﬃcient allocation of shares in this econ-
omy requires that trader i holds s∗i = (S/K)ki shares of the stock.
This is also achieved in the (unique) competitive equilibrium at price
p∗ = µ−S/(τK); see Wilson (1968). Clearly, the unique eﬃcient alloca-
tion of shares is associated with a continuum of feasible allocations for
cash; each of these determines a diﬀerent apportionment of the gains
from trade. Therefore, allocative eﬃciency corresponds to handing out
stock in a unique way; allocative fairness has to do with how cash is
redistributed during the trading that takes place before the eﬃcient
stock allocation is attained.
We emphasize that our setup is not meant to replicate the struc-
ture of a stock market; in particular, informational eﬀects are ruled
out. The underlying economy can be described as an exchange market
for one good, where traders have strictly decreasing linear demands
and heterogeneous preferences that are driven by a particularly simple
parameterizations.
6.2.2 The market protocols
We compare the performances of four market protocols: a batch auc-
tion, a continuous double auction, a nondiscretionary dealership, and
a hybrid of these last two. The ﬁrst protocol is simultaneous, while
the other three are sequential. The following features are common to
all protocols. See LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2006, 2007) for a complete
description of the protocols and details on their implementation.
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A protocol is organized in trading sessions (or days). Agents partic-
ipate in every trading session, but each of them can exchange at most
one share per session. Reaching an eﬃcient allocation requires multi-
ple rounds of trading. If the protocol is sequential, the order in which
agents place their orders is randomly chosen for each trading session. If
the protocol is simultaneous, all order are made known and processed
simultaneously so the time of their submission is irrelevant. The books
are completely cleared at the end of each trading session. Prices are
ticked and, for convenience, the tick is set equal to 1; in other words,
prices must be integers.
6.2.3 Behavioral assumptions and fair shares
The following behavioral assumptions hold for each trader. An agent is
restricted to trade one unit at a time. Budget constraints must be satis-
ﬁed. Given the demand function (6.1), trader i has decreasing marginal
utility for additional units. If the current endowment of a trader is s,
his valuation for the next unit to trade is
vi(±1) = µ− s± 1
τki
(6.2)
where the ± sign depends on whether the attempted trade is a pur-
chase or a sale. Hence, his reservation price depends on the side of the
transaction he is entering and on his current endowment si. Moreover,
his certainty equivalent for holding quantities c and s of cash and stock
is
mi(c, s) = c +
(
µ− s
2τki
)
s (6.3)
It is worth noting that the certainty equivalent mi accounts for c at face
value but evaluates s using an individual “price of risk” µ− [s/(2τki)].
The initial endowment (c0i , s
0
i ) of a trader i provides him with a
certainty equivalent m0i = mi(c
0
i , s
0
i ). We deﬁne his “fair share” m
∗
i
of gains from trade as the certainty equivalent he would attain under
the ﬁctitious protocol of Walrasian taˆtonnement, where a centralized
market maker iteratively elicit traders’ excess demand functions and
keeps adjusting prices to equilibrate them before trade takes actually
place. Under standard conditions, this protocol is a natural benchmark
because it attains allocative eﬃciency in one giant step, while simulta-
neously minimizing both the volume of transactions and price disper-
sion. For later use please note that, under this protocol, a trader with
ex ante knowledge of the equilibrium price p∗ would attain exactly the
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same ﬁnal certainty equivalent and thus would not be able to increase
his fair share.
Under the Walrasian protocol, a trader i ends up with cash c∗i =
c0i−p∗i (s∗i−s0i ) and stock s∗i = (S/K)ki. After substitution, the certainty
equivalent of his fair share is
m∗i = c
0
i − p∗(s∗i − s0i ) + s∗i
(
µ− s
∗
i
2τki
)
=
c0i +
(
µ− S
2τK
)
s0i +
S
2τK
(
S
K
ki − s0i
)
which nicely decomposes into the sum of three terms. The ﬁrst one is
the initial cash endowment of trader i; the second is the “value” of his
initial stock endowment at the market price of risk; the third one is
a positive correction term that is increasing in the diﬀerence between
the eﬃcient and the initial stock endowment for i. Since trading is
voluntary, individual rationality implies that the diﬀerence between
the fair share and the initial certainty equivalent for each i is positive:
m∗i −m0i =
(
Ks0i − kiS
)2
2τkiK2
≥ 0
We expect that market protocols aﬀect how much of their fair share
diﬀerent families of agents manage to obtain in the end. This requires
to aggregate social welfare over groups of agents. We measure the social
welfare of a group G by the sum of the certainty equivalents across the
traders in G. Given the initial endowments (c0i , s
0
i ) of each trader i,
the (initial) social welfare of the entire traders’ population is M0 =∑
i mi(c
0
i , s
0
i ). After reaching an eﬃcient allocation, the social welfare
increases to
M∗ =
∑
i
m∗i = C +
(
µ− S
2τK
)
S (6.4)
which is the analog of Equation (6.3) at the market level. We slightly
abuse notation here, because M∗ is achieved by any eﬃcient alloca-
tion including (but not limited to) the one induced by the Walrasian
procedure. Looking at the left-hand side of Figure 6.1, eﬃcient trading
expands the pie from M0 to M∗.
Consider now a strict subset G of traders. They start with an initial
endowment that corresponds to a social welfare M0G =
∑
i∈G m
0
i for the
group G. The fair share of this group is M∗G =
∑
i∈G m
∗
i ≥M0G. In the
right-hand side of Figure 6.1, we represent M0G as the circular sector
from the inside circle and M∗G as the union of M
0
G and the annular sector
86 M. LiCalzi and P. Pellizzari
M*
0
M
A
?
G
M*
?
G
0
M
?
G
Fig. 6.1. Gains from trade and fairness.
topping it. In general, M∗G expands but need not be proportional to M
0
G.
Suppose now that at the end of a trading protocol, the social welfare
of a group G is M∗G∪AG so that the group G is extracting higher gains
from trade than its fair share. Then we say that the protocol has been
too favorable to the traders in G or, equivalently, that it has been unfair
to the traders in the complementary set Gc. Hence, allocative fairness
is about how the larger pie created by trading is redistributed among
diﬀerent groups of traders. Similarly to a zero-sum game, a trader gets
more than his fair share by taking away a piece of someone’s else fair
share.
Our approach to study allocative fairness is to split the traders’
population into two families and compare the ability of market proto-
cols to prevent one group from exploiting the other one. For realism,
we assume that all agents are individually rational: regardless of which
family he belongs to, each agent accepts a trade only if this cannot
decrease his current certainty equivalent. An agent who undertakes a
sequence of trades over time increases (possibly, weakly) his own cer-
tainty equivalent in each transaction. This assumption, for instance, is
consistent with zero-intelligence.
Our two families of interacting traders are chosen to emphasize dif-
ferences in the ability to appropriate gains from trade. Notably, individ-
ual rationality alone cannot prevent a purchase from an inframarginal
seller even if this reduces the potential gains from a speciﬁc trade. Put
diﬀerently, individual rationality protects a buyer from making a per-
sonal loss on a trade but does not imply that he is trading with the
“right” counterpart. This stronger guarantee requires knowledge of the
equilibrium price p∗ in order to spot and refuse inframarginal trades.
We assume that some traders satisfy only individual rationality while
others can do better because they know p∗ as well.1
The ﬁrst group is formed by the truth-telling (from now on, TT)
traders described in LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2007). At the start of a
1 An alternative assumption is that only the second type of traders are able to
compute or deduce p∗ from the available information.
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trading session, a TT trader chooses with equal probability on which
side of the market (buy or sell) he attempts to trade one unit. Suppose
he goes for a purchase; the case of a sale is analogous. Given his current
endowment, the agent knows that his valuation for the next unit to buy
is vi(+1) from Equation (6.2). In a batch auction, he truthfully bids
vi(+1). In a sequential protocol, he checks ﬁrst if the best current ask
price is p ≤ vi(+1); if so, he buys one unit at p. Otherwise, he places a
bid equal to vi(+1). In other words, when no better deal is available, a
TT buyer posts a bid equal to his current valuation for the next unit to
buy and thus “truthfully” reveals his reservation value. Compared to
zero-intelligence trading, a TT agent is less greedy because he posts the
largest bid that is individually rational given his own valuation. When
a TT agent buys one unit at a price p higher than the equilibrium price
p∗, he increases his certainty equivalent but eats up a piece (p− p∗) of
his fair share.
The second group of agents consists of traders that know the correct
equilibrium price; we call them price-informed (from now on, PI). This
extreme assumption is a very parsimonious way to endow these agents
with the ability to cut down on inframarginal trades and make sure
that they never lose on their fair share. Given his current endowment,
a PI agent knows that he should be a buyer if vi(+1) ≥ p∗ and a seller
if vi(−1) ≤ p∗. Therefore, he never needs to guess which side he should
take.
Suppose that the PI agent should be a buyer; the opposite case
is analogous. In a batch auction, he simply bids p∗. In a sequential
protocol, a PI trader must take action when he is called out and cannot
wait for better terms. When it is his turn, he ﬁrst looks for “sure deals”
by checking whether the best current ask price is pa ≤ p∗ or the best bid
price is pb ≥ p∗; if so, he buys or sell one unit, respectively. Otherwise,
and limitedly to the two book-based protocols, a PI agent places a
bid that improves the current best bid pb by one tick and achieves
time-price priority at a buying price never greater than p∗. In general,
the trading strategy of a PI agent has three characteristics: ﬁrst, he
never fails to exploit opportunities for trading oﬀ the equilibrium price;
second, he never trades at a price worse than p∗ (and hence never
loses on his fair share); third, conditional on these two constraints,
he maximizes the probability of trading in the right direction. This
last restriction is chosen to emphasize the ability of PI traders to take
advantage of TT agents.
Depending on the protocols and the random sequence of trades,
the attainment of full allocative eﬃciency may sometimes fail. For
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instance, in the nondiscretionary dealership, the existence of a ﬁxed
bid-ask spread may prevent two or more TT agents from completing
their few last trades. This may (albeit marginally) reduce the overall
gains from trade and lower allocative eﬃciency, confusing our study
of allocative fairness. To rule out this spurious eﬀect, after all trad-
ing opportunities within the protocol are exhausted, we force agents to
carry out all residual eﬃcient trades at price p∗. We emphasize that
this has the only purpose of actually realizing the full pie M∗ so that
we can concentrate on its redistribution; in particular, none of these
ﬁnal trades eats up on the fair share of a trader.
Let MTG be the ﬁnal fair share of a group G when trading takes
place using a trading protocol T . Given their information and trading
strategies, only PI agents can “exploit” TT traders. Therefore, when-
ever allocative eﬃciency is attained, MTG ≥ M∗G for G = PI and any
protocol T among the four we consider. We can thus test the ability of
a trading protocol T to foster a fair allocation by comparing MTG −M∗G
for G = PI.
Clearly, the ability of the PI group to exploit TT traders depends
also on the proportion π of PI traders in the market. The more the
exploiters, the harder becomes the competition for trades at prices
diﬀerent from p∗. Therefore, we study how allocative fairness is aﬀected
by the proportion π in (0, 1). Endpoints of the interval are ruled out to
avoid trivialities.
6.3 Experimental design
6.3.1 Identiﬁcation
The global parameters are the number n of traders, the mean µ and
the variance σ2 of the realization value of the asset, the number t of
trading sessions, and the number λ of PI traders. (The proportion of
PI agents is π = λ/n.) Individually, a trader i is characterized by his
coeﬃcient ki of risk tolerance and by his endowment of cash ci and
asset shares si. Finally, for protocols involving the dealer, we need to
select her initial quotes and a (ﬁxed) spread.
The exemplar for our simulations is similar to that one used in
LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2006). The basic parametric conﬁguration is
reported in Table 6.1. The ratio S/K = 2 implies that the competitive
equilibrium price is p∗ = µ − σ2(S/K) = 760. The initial dealer’s
quotes in the nondiscretionary dealership are a bid of 755 and an ask
of 765, with a ﬁxed bid-ask spread of 10. In the hybrid protocol, where
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Parameters Initialization
Global n = 1, 000
µ = 1, 000
σ2 = 120
t = 500
λ = integer in (0, n)
Trader ki = divisors of σ2 in {10, . . . , 40}
ci = 50, 000
si = permutation of 2ki
Table 6.1. Exemplar for identiﬁcation.
the dealer’s presence restricts the ability of PI traders to steal better
deals, the initial bid and ask prices of 745 and 775 exactly straddle the
equilibrium price of 760, with a ﬁxed spread of 30.
The robustness tests reported in Section 6.4.1 change one parameter
at a time with respect to this exemplar. We have worked out simula-
tions where the ratio S/K is 1 (or 3), making the equilibrium price
higher (lower); where the dealer’s ﬁxed spread in the nondiscretionary
dealership is 6 (or 30), making the market more (less) liquid; and where
the ﬁxed spread in the hybrid protocol takes diﬀerent values between
4 and 300, making the dealer’s presence more or less inﬂuential.
6.3.2 Simulations and data representation
A round of testing simulates traders’ behavior in 4 diﬀerent protocols
for diﬀerent values of λ. A typical cycle is run as follows. We ﬁx an inte-
ger value of λ in the range {1, . . . , n−1} and then we randomly choose
diﬀerent queues of traders for each trading session. These choices are
kept ﬁxed across the four protocols, so that each of them is tested using
the same fraction of PI traders and the same orderings in each trading
sessions. All other parameters are instantiated as per the exemplar in
Table 6.1. The number of agents is n = 1000; we run 999 trials per cycle
and test each value of λ from 1 to 999. At the end of each simulation,
we compute and record all relevant statistics. The simulations are run
using a package of routines written in Pascal. The statistical and graph-
ical analysis of the data are made using R, an open-source environment
for statistical computing available at http://www.r-project.org/.
We use two (normalized) measures to assess the allocative fairness
of a protocol. Let MTG be the ﬁnal share of the group G when trading
takes place using a trading protocol T and M∗G their fair share (using
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the Walrasian protocol). As discussed above, only PI agents can “ex-
ploit” TT traders; hence, we ﬁx G = PI for the rest of the paper. The
ﬁrst measure is the absolute excess gain (MTG −M∗G)/M0 for the group
G. The division by the size M0 of the initial pie is a normalization
introduced to make the index scale–free and allow direct comparisons;
however, for simplicity, in the rest of the paper we write the absolute
excess gain as MTG −M∗G and leave the normalization implicit. The sec-
ond measure is the relative excess gain (MTG −M∗G)/M∗G. The absolute
excess gain reports how much welfare PI traders collectively take away
from TT traders with respect to the initial pie. The relative excess gain
measures how much (on average) a PI trader is expected to improve
his ﬁnal welfare by trading within a given protocol.
A graphical representation of each set of data is obtained as fol-
lows. Given a protocol T , we plot the 999 data points produced in a
simulation. We then ﬁt a smoothing function generated by applying
a Friedman smoother to all the data points associated with the same
protocol; see Venables and Ripley (2002). Reading Figure 6.2 from left
to right exempliﬁes this procedure for the case of a continuous double
auction.
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Fig. 6.2. Realizations (left) and a superimposed Friedman smoother (right).
6.4 Results
Figure 6.3 shows two representative pictures based on our exemplar.
The ﬁgure on the left reports the (normalized) absolute excess gain
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MTG −M∗G collectively achieved by the PI traders as a function of their
cardinality λ for four protocols: batch auction, continuous double auc-
tion, nondiscretionary dealership, and the hybridization of these two
latter protocols. Note that dividing λ by n = 1000 gives the proportion
π of PI agents active in the market.
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Fig. 6.3. Absolute (left) and relative (right) excess gain for PI traders.
The ﬁrst comment is that the batch auction protects the TT traders
much more eﬀectively than any other protocol for both measures and
for any number of PI traders. This is not surprising: the batch auc-
tion protocol requires simultaneous submission of trading orders and is
therefore much more diﬃcult for PI agents to exploit. By posting an
order at p∗, each PI trader maximizes the probability of trading under
the constraint of never losing on his fair share. Whenever the trading
price issued in a session of the batch auction is diﬀerent from p∗, he
cuts away a piece of a TT trader’s fair share. However, because the
batch auction aggregates all the orders received in a trading session,
it is very unlikely to issue a trading price diﬀerent from p∗. We can
thus shift our focus of interest to the three sequential protocols. For
completeness, however, we report also the data relative to the batch
auction.
The second comment is that in general the absolute excess gain
for sequential protocols is a unimodal function of λ. Therefore, the
collective ability of PI to exploit TT traders peaks at some intermediate
value of λ. In this respect, there is a natural ordering of protocols from
dealership to hybrid protocol to continuous double auction that appears
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twice. First, the maximum excess gain for PI traders is increasing in
the natural ordering of protocols. Simultaneously, the value of λ that
maximizes the PI excess gain is decreasing. In other words, PI traders
can achieve a greater excess gain in a continuous double auction, but
their most eﬀective proportion in such protocol is lower.
The result that the excess gain is increasing in the natural ordering
is a direct consequence of the “protection” that the dealership provides.
Because the dealer posts bid and ask prices that tend to straddle the
correct p∗, the transaction price is never too diﬀerent from this lat-
ter price; hence, no much fair share can be lost. The result that the
λ’s maximizing total excess gain are decreasing in the natural ordering
can be heuristically explained by the combination of two eﬀects. Intu-
itively, PI traders are most eﬀective to exploit TT traders when their
proportion is neither too low (there must be enough exploiters around)
neither too high (there must be enough people to exploit). But we can
put a bit more ﬂesh on this explanation.
Consider the continuous double auction. The overall fair share for
the TT group that PI traders can appropriate is roughly proportional
to (1 − π). On the other hand, taken as a group, the TT traders can
lose a piece of their fair share only when one of them trades with a
PI agent at a price diﬀerent from p∗. The probability of a PI agent
being matched for trade with a TT agent is roughly proportional to
π(1−π). Therefore, the excess gain appropriated by the PI group in the
continuous double auction are approximately proportional to π(1−π)2
and the maximum should be attained around πˆ = 1/3, corresponding
to λ = nπˆ = 333 in our exemplar. The actual value is somewhat lower
because some matchings between PI and TT agents do not lead to any
trade.
Consider now the dealership. The overall fair share that PI traders
can appropriate is still roughly proportional to (1− π). Moreover, be-
cause they can only trade with an impersonal dealer, the probability
of a trade involving a PI agent is roughly proportional to the fraction
π. Therefore, the excess gain for the PI group is now approximately
proportional to π(1− π) and the maximum should be attained around
πˆ = 1/2, corresponding to λ = 500 in our exemplar. As before, the ex-
act value of the maximizer is aﬀected by microstructural considerations
that this heuristic argument does not capture. Finally, the correspond-
ing values for the hybrid protocol are a convex combination of those of
the parent protocols.
The third comment is that there are no important diﬀerences among
sequential protocols when π (or λ) is suﬃciently large, because there
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are too few TT traders to be exploited. The overall fair share to be
appropriated is roughly proportional to (1−π) and for large π there is
simply too little to be taken away by the PI group. Moreover, markets
with a high proportion of PI traders tend to exhibit a similar degree
of allocative fairness because a PI agent never loses on his fair share.
Therefore, we restrict the following comparisons to π ≤ 40%, corre-
sponding to λ ≤ 400 in our exemplar. For any proportion π ≤ 40%, the
ranking over sequential mechanisms concerning their ability to prevent
PI agents from eroding TT traders’ fair shares is clear-cut and follows
the natural ordering.
The right-hand side of Figure 6.3 reports the relative extra gain
(MTS −M∗S)/M∗S collectively achieved by the PI traders as a function of
their number λ for the three sequential protocols. Unsurprisingly, this
shows that increasing the number of exploiters makes their “looting”
less eﬀective for each protocol. Moreover, the ranking is again clear-
cut and follows the natural ordering. Finally, this eﬀect is essentially
unchanged in all the additional tests reported in the following section.
6.4.1 Tests of robustness
We have run some robustness tests by changing one parameter at a
time in the exemplar. The ﬁrst test looks at diﬀerences in the total
endowment of stock, leading to a diﬀerent equilibrium price p∗. The
exemplar has a ratio S/K = 2 yielding p∗ = 1000 − 120(S/K) = 760
and generates the left-hand side of Figure 6.3. We keep the same ki for
each trader i, but endow him with a diﬀerent multiple of his original
endowment si. This changes the ratio si/ki and of course S/K as well.
Figure 6.4 reports data when S/K = 1 (on the left) and S/K = 3
(on the right), corresponding respectively to a smaller and to a larger
total endowment of stock. The equilibrium prices are now 880 and 640,
respectively. We adjust the initial dealer’s quotes accordingly, making
sure that they always exactly straddle the equilibrium price.
Comparing the two ﬁgures from Figure 6.4 (as well as the right-hand
side of Figure 6.3) shows that a larger stock endowment S increases
the relative excess gain (MTG −M∗G)/M∗G of PI for each protocol and
each λ. We do not report the ﬁgures for the absolute excess gain to
preserve space, but they exhibit a similar increasing eﬀect. In fact,
the following argument shows that, over our range of choices for S/K,
an increasing relative excess gain implies an increasing absolute excess
gain. The quantity M∗G is roughly proportional to πM
∗; in turn, M∗ is
increasing in (S/K) as far as τµ ≥ (S/K) — as seen by diﬀerentiating
(6.4) with respect to S. As this inequality holds for our choices of S/K,
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Fig. 6.4. Diﬀerent equilibrium prices: S/K = 1 (left) and S/K = 3 (right).
the denominator of the relative excess gain is increasing and the claim
follows. Put diﬀerently, this shows that a higher stock endowment S
brings about a roughly proportional increase in the absolute excess
gain.
The increase in the relative excess gain exhibited by Figure 6.4 is
a stronger property that is explained by a second perhaps less obvious
eﬀect. Ceteris paribus, a larger S increases the number of trades that
need to be carried out in order to reach the allocative eﬃciency. Each of
these trades is a potential opportunity for PI agents to exploit, making
them more likely to extract excess gain from the TT agents. This second
eﬀect accounts for the increase in the relative excess gain.
The second test considers the eﬀect of changing the dealer’s ﬁxed
spread in the nondiscretionary dealership, while keeping his initial
quotes centered around the equilibrium price. The exemplar has a ﬁxed
spread of 10. Figure 6.5 reports the absolute excess gain when the ﬁxed
spread is 6 (bottom), 10 (middle), or 30 (top). The lower the spread,
the more inﬂuential is the dealer’s ability to constrain prices within a
narrow band that individually rational trading naturally tends to keep
around the equilibrium price p∗. Forcing the transaction price to lie in a
band, of course, protects TT agents from more serious mispricings and
hence reduces the ability of PI traders to exploit them. Accordingly,
we see in Figure 6.5 that the absolute excess gain is increasing in the
dealer’s ﬁxed spread for any number λ of PI traders.
A third test checks the eﬀect of changing the dealer’s ﬁxed spread
in the hybrid protocol dealership where an agent has access both to the
dealer’s quotes and to a book fed with limit orders from other traders.
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Fig. 6.5. Diﬀerent ﬁxed spreads in the dealership: 6, 10, 30 (bottom to top).
The exemplar has a ﬁxed spread of 30. Figure 6.6 reports the absolute
excess gain when this ﬁxed spread takes ﬁve diﬀerent values from 4
(bottom) to 300 (top). The absolute excess gain is increasing in the
dealer’s ﬁxed spread for any number λ of PI traders. This eﬀect and
its explanation are analogous to the above. There is a second more
interesting eﬀect to note. In terms of the ability to control the absolute
excess gain, the continuous double auction is the limit case of the hybrid
protocol as the ﬁxed spread goes to +∞. When the dealer posts bid
and ask that are too far apart, trading takes place only on the book.
Accordingly, as we move from a low to a high spread, the excess gain
curve morphs from the shape associated with a dealership to the shape
associated with a continuous double auction; for instance, the peak
increases and shifts leftward.
6.5 Conclusions
We have studied the performance of four market protocols with regard
to their ability to equitably distribute the gains from trade among two
groups of participants in an exchange economy. We assume Walrasian
tatoˆnemment as benchmark and deﬁne the fair share that should ac-
crue to a trader as the certainty equivalent he would attain under this
procedure.
When necessary, the ﬁrst group of traders bids or asks their reser-
vation value; this makes sure that trading never decreases their own
certainty equivalent but exposes them to a possible loss on their fair
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Fig. 6.6. Diﬀerent dealer’s spreads in the hybrid protocol: 4, 10, 30, 100, 300
(bottom to top).
share. The second group of traders knows (or can compute) the equi-
librium price p∗ and uses this information to make sure that trading
cannot reduce either their certainty equivalent or their own fair share.
We test the allocative fairness of protocols by running (computer-
ized) experiments where these two families of traders interact with each
other. We ﬁnd that there is a clear-cut ranking of protocols with respect
to allocative fairness, deﬁned as their ability to prevent PI agents from
eroding TT traders’ fair shares. Going from best to worst, this ranking
is: batch auction, nondiscretionary dealership, the hybridization of a
dealership and a continuous double auction, and ﬁnally the pure con-
tinuous double auction. The same ranking holds when we replace the
absolute excess gain for PI traders with their relative excess gain.
Acknowledgement. We thank two referees for their comments and acknowl-
edge ﬁnancial support from MIUR.
References
E. Fehr, G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Riedl. Does fairness prevent market
clearing? an experimental investigation. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 108(2):437–459, May 1993.
D. K. Gode and S. Sunder. Allocative eﬃciency of markets with zero-
intelligence traders: Market as a partial substitute for individual ra-
6 Market Protocols and Fair Trading 97
tionality. Journal of Political Economy, 101(1):119–137, February
1993.
L. Hurwicz. Economic design, adjustment and mechanism. Economic
Design, 1:1–14, 1994.
M. LiCalzi and P. Pellizzari. The allocative eﬀectiveness of market
protocols under intelligent trading. In C. Bruun, editor, Advances in
Artiﬁcial Economics, pages 17–29. Springer, 2006.
M. LiCalzi and P. Pellizzari. Simple market protocols for eﬃcient risk
sharing. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2007. Forth-
coming.
W. N. Venables and B. D. Ripley. Modern Applied Statistics with S.
Springer, fourth edition, 2002.
R. Wilson. The theory of syndicates. Econometrica, pages 119–132,
1968.
